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Evaluating Crime as a Negative Externality of Hosting Mega-Events: Econometric Analysis of 
the 2012 London Summer Olympics 
 
 
Nicholas Le* 
 
Abstract 
 
Analysis of the benefits and the drawbacks of hosting large-scale sporting events like the 
Olympics or World Cup frequently ignore the effects of crime due to its relatively small 
economic impact in comparison to employment and consumption effects. Literature has 
frequently tied sporting events and tourism to crime, in addition to observing proximity 
effects on crime during sporting events. This research seeks to confirm both by 
implementing a difference-in-difference regression that can show whether crime 
increased during the Olympics, in particular in London boroughs which hosted venues 
for the Games. Ultimately, the research concludes that crime in London as a whole does 
increase although it is unable to find statistically significant evidence that crime increased 
in host boroughs at a magnitude larger than the general increase in crime in the city. 
Likely reasons we have been unsuccessful in pinpointing the location effects include data 
limitations (daily data would be superior to monthly data due to the dates during which 
the event was hosted) and the relatively small geographical size of each host borough, as 
well as their proximity to one another. 
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1 Introduction 
A variety of factors combine to produce the allure of hosting a sporting mega-event, such as the 
World Cup, Olympics and Super Bowl. Of these factors, some are easily quantifiable, while 
others are much less so. It seems to be a “common-sense” expectation that hosting such an event 
is beneficial to a city or country by improving employment outcomes for residents, increasing 
expected income for residents, adding revenue to local businesses (which in turn trickles down to 
the government via taxes), and improving economic growth for the city or nation in the long run. 
Though little academic research has offered support for this assumption, Hotchkiss, Moore, and 
Zobay (2003) found positive employment effect and improved growth rates for both employment 
and wages in the state of Georgia in the aftermath of the 1996 Summer Olympics. Each of these 
perceived benefits falls within the realm of the easily quantifiable. However, other possible 
effects are much harder to find reliable data for. For instance, it also stands to reason that hosting 
an event like the World Cup or Olympics, with the unparalleled degree of international 
recognition each of these events promise, could lead to improvements in national morale and an 
increasingly favorable perception of the host nation given a smoothly-running event. Both of 
these potential outcomes, while observable to an extent, are far more difficult to quantify than 
the aforementioned economic impacts to the host country or region. However, crime provides a 
subset of economic data which bridges both what can easily be quantified and what cannot.  
Crime has frequently been tied to macroeconomic variables. For instance, unemployment 
has been associated with increases in both property crime and its elasticity (Lin 2008). Other 
research suggests that a relationship between real income per capita and crime could exist 
(Habibullah and Law, 2008). Additionally, it is related to both the happiness of the populace by 
serving as a detriment to their living conditions, and high crime rates, perhaps given more 
attention by the national spotlight a host country or city is placed under during such an event, 
undoubtedly result in a poorer international perception of the nation. This research paper seeks to 
examine the relationship between the hosting of the mega-event and the rate of occurrence of a 
variety of crimes. We also seek to test the hypothesis that proximity to locations in which events 
are held have an influence on crime rates. The basis behind this possibility is opportunistic crime 
occurring in areas where large groups of unaware tourists gather, who are likely unfamiliar with 
the area and possibly drunk. It specifically examines the city of London during the 2012 Olympic 
Summer Games, in equal parts due to the recentness of the event and the lack of reliable 
information for other recent mega-events which may be more interesting due to their host 
countries being developing nations; for instance the 2010 World Cup in South Africa, the 2016 
World Cup in Brazil, and the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro. These questions are 
relevant and economically significant due to the dearth of research geared towards examining the 
more difficult to quantify aspects of mega-event hosting. One previous examination of mega-
events focused primarily on economic benefits; however despite a failure to find statistically 
significant evidence that any kind of income or employment effects exist, the authors refused to 
commit to a conclusion that mega-events were good or bad for the host nation due to the difficult 
to quantify effects, like increased happiness to residents of the area (Hagn and Maennig, 2008). 
A similar analysis of the broad costs and benefits of hosting was published by Baade and 
Matheson (2016). Although costs are frequently difficult to quantify, in part due to corruption, 
benefits are far clearer. The include direct benefits, such as ticket revenue and television rights, 
but also indirect economic benefits of employment and consumption tied to preparation for the 
event and the tourism that comes with hosting. Additional concern is voiced over upward bias in 
ex-post analysis of these events, due to crowding out of local residents’ expenditure and 
crowding out of other tourists. Their ultimate conclusion, differing from Hagn and Maennig, is 
that Olympic hosting is economically unviable. Though the research on this paper is unable to 
provide a definitive answer to the level at which host citizens are affected, it tackles the topic 
tangentially by trying to quantify the effect of a negative externality that adversely affects them; 
crime. Attempting to quantify negative externalities, as we attempt to do in this paper, is one 
important step in developing a more comprehensive picture of the true cost of hosting mega-
events. 
 
2 Background and Literature Review 
Both mega-events and crime are fairly well-researched topics in economic literature, although 
convincing research that explicitly focuses on the relationship between the two is fairly sparse. 
Perhaps the most relevant prior research is Campaniello’s examination of mega-events and 
crime, which attempts to link specific types of crime to the hosting of the 1990 World Cup in 
Italy (2013). Though the model utilized in this paper contains many similar elements as ours, it is 
important to note that the “treatment” period considered by Campaniello was the entire year 
during which the event was held, more than double the length of ours. Campaniello ultimately 
concludes that a causal effect between being a host city and most kinds of property-related crime 
exists, including bag-snatching, pick-pocketing, shoplifting and burglary. A similar study of the 
2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympics observed that while calls reporting crime and police 
activity increased during the games, the effect dissipated following the end of the event (Decker, 
Varano and Greene 2007). It should be noted that although the event was very similar to the 
Games which are the subject of our research, the host cities differ greatly. Salt Lake City is much 
more isolated than London, and is more demographically homogenous which suggests difficulty 
in a direct comparison between the findings of our research and theirs. 
Further research can be found dealing with the relationship between broader tourism and 
crime, which relates closely with our topic because mega events are largely geared towards 
tourists. In particular, Howsen and Jarrell (1990), McPheters and Stronge (1974), and Harper 
(2001) find that tourism has a positive impact on the crimes of burglary, larceny, and robbery but 
no impact on crimes against the person, suggesting that that influxes of strangers to a new area 
(specifically seasonal tourism in these three papers) result in the negative externality of increased 
property crime. Analysis of the America’s Cup Yacht race from late 1999 to early 2000 in New 
Zealand provides further evidence that crime can be associated with special events, and was 
specifically tied to an influx of tourists (Barker, Meyer and Page 2002). This directly relates to 
our study due to the influx of tourists who flock to see the Olympic Games. The distinction that 
these different authors draw, in addition to Campaniello’s treatment of different types of crime in 
her analysis of Italia 1990, suggests the importance of separating crime types in our own 
research. An additional study, observing an outdoor football stadium and an indoor multipurpose 
venue, noted that crime effects were unobservable in terms of their contribution to an overall 
increase in crime between event days and nonevent days; however, effects were observable when 
proximity to the stadium was a factor in the analysis (Billings and Depken 2011). The findings of 
this study were a large part of the reason we include dummy variables for each borough hosting 
Olympic events, as these findings provide reason to believe proximity effects are not negligible.  
Contrary to other research, Hiller (2000) examines mega-events’ potential to reduce 
crime, specifically in the context of the 2004 Olympic bid by Cape Town. He suggests that 
infrastructure provided by the event allows sport to be offered as an alternative to crime for local 
youth. Though this is a valid observation, the longer term effects of the events, such as this, are 
beyond the scope of this paper or our data. 
 
3 Data Discussion 
Data for this project is taken primarily from the Metropolitan Police Service of London database 
on crime. It is separated into a variety of types of offenses. These are violence against the person, 
sexual crimes, robbery, burglary, theft, fraud, damage, drugs and other. Each of these categories 
provided can be parsed out into further subcategories. However, for this research we combine the 
various categories into crimes against person and crimes against property. The former group 
contains violent and sexual crimes as well as robbery, while the latter includes burglary, theft 
and damage. It is important to note that we have omitted the drug, fraud, and other categories of 
offenses due to our separation of the crime statistics into these two groups, as these (relatively 
small) categories of crime do not fit well into either one. At surface level it seems that there is a 
slight difference in the means of property crime and crimes against the person, with host 
boroughs exhibiting higher crime rates for both categories. However, it should be obvious that 
this superficial level of analysis fails to account for other differences in other variables that affect 
crime. For interpretation purposes it should also be noted that crime figures are reported as the 
actual values which occurred; that is there is no scaling of crime occurrences. Also included are 
macroeconomic control variables as well, for United Kingdom average wages and United 
Kingdom unemployment. Data for both of these metrics comes from the Office for National 
Statistics. Aside from macroeconomic controls, data takes a panel format, with the 33 London 
boroughs observed over the 36 month period from April 2011 to March 2014, with the amount 
that each crime is reported to the police given on a monthly basis. Of the 33 boroughs, six were 
home to venues for various Olympic events. These were Barking and Dagenham, Greenwich, 
Hackney, Newham, Tower Hamlets and Waltham Forest. The time during which the Olympics 
were held is also noteworthy; the games began in late July 2012 and concluded in mid-August of 
the same year. Although the games were held over a short period, it is fair to assume that the 
time period over which effects that the games might have had could be observable over a longer 
period. For instance, the employment benefits associated with hosting would have been realized 
a year or more in advance of the games due to the time consuming nature of large scale 
construction projects. 
4 Methodology 
Due to the nature of our data and research questions, we use a difference-in-difference 
approach in order to interpret the borough-level effects of having a venue during the event. We 
look at the effect of crime in two separate models, one evaluating crime against persons and the 
other evaluating property crime, with other aspects of the model being the same. Subscript i 
refers to a specific borough while subscript t refers to a specific month. The model had treatment 
groups as the aforementioned six boroughs that held events while the time of treatment was 
taken as the two months during which Olympic Events occurred, July 2012 and August 2012. 
Thus, our DID variable is the interaction between the time period during which the games were 
held and the borough in which they were held. Although a Hausman test indicated random 
effects estimator as a superior alternative to fixed effects, both are reported in this paper due to 
the Hausman test’s known oversensitivity in rejecting fixed effects estimators, coupled with the 
intuitive borough level differences that likely exist. Therefore, random effects and fixed effects 
are used in one of our estimations, as well as a simple DID regression model. A Levin Lin Chu 
Test was additionally performed, which failed to find evidence of a unit root. Also included are 
monthly dummies to account for seasonality effects on crime and United Kingdom national 
average wage and unemployment levels as general controls, in line with the research by Lin 
(2008) and Habibullah and Law (2008). Thus, our model is as follows: 
 
(1, 2, 3)  Crime Against Person𝑖𝑖t = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1(Time)𝑖𝑖t + 𝛽𝛽2(Treat)𝑖𝑖t + 𝛽𝛽3 (DID) 𝑖𝑖t + 𝛽𝛽4(Monthly 
Dummies)  + 𝛽𝛽5(Average Wage)t  + 𝛽𝛽6(Unemployment)t + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖jt  (Model 1 is with random effects, Model 2 with fixed effects and Model 3 without either) 
(4, 5, 6)  Property Crime𝑖𝑖t = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1(Time)𝑖𝑖t + 𝛽𝛽2(Treat)𝑖𝑖t + 𝛽𝛽3 (DID) 𝑖𝑖t + 𝛽𝛽4(Monthly Dummies)  
+ 𝛽𝛽5(Average Wage)t  + 𝛽𝛽6(Unemployment)t + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖jt  (Model 4 is with random effects, Model 5 with fixed effects and Model 6 without either) 
 
This model setup alters coefficient interpretations. 𝛽𝛽1 is interpreted as the expected 
average change in crime during the event for only the control group, while 𝛽𝛽2 corresponds to the 
mean difference between the six host boroughs and the non-host boroughs outside of the time 
during which the Olympics were held. 𝛽𝛽3 is the coefficient of most interest given our research 
question; the DID estimator shows the mean change in crime between host boroughs and non-
host boroughs. 
 
5 Results and Discussion 
Regression results are reported below, in Figure 1. Monthly dummy variable estimations are not 
reported. 
 Figure 1 
 
The regression results suggest that average wage increases are associated with decreases in 
crime, generally at a statistically significant level. However, we fail to find a consistent 
relationship between unemployment and crime across different model variations. Additionally, 
insignificance of the DID coefficient suggests we are unable to verify increased crime in host 
boroughs during the Games. The coefficients are positive, albeit insignificantly so. However, it is 
worth noting that both fixed and random effects estimations yielded positive, statistically 
significant coefficients in front of the Olympic variable. This suggests an increase of crime 
during the Olympics in non-host boroughs. On the basis of this observation, it appears that 
although we are able to rule out crime increasing in boroughs which held venues for the event, 
crime in London as a whole increased as a result of the Olympics. A likely cause of our 
observations relates to a detail of the proximity effect observed by Billings and Depkens (2011). 
Their research focuses on one stadium, and proximity effects in a several mile radius outside of 
it. Therefore, pinpointing location-related effects is problematic given both the small geographic 
size of London boroughs and also the close proximity of host boroughs to one another. This 
hypothesis partially explains Campaniello’s findings, as the distance between host cities at the 
1990 Italy World Cup was much greater than the distance between boroughs at these Olympics 
(2013). The estimator for the Host Boroughs variable is omitted in the fixed effect regression 
results due to collinearity with firm fixed effects. Also notable is the fact that although statistical 
significance is found with some variables, the magnitude of the results suggests little economic 
significance, with the largest coefficients on the Olympic variable being akin to an increase of 
only about 40 property crime incidents during the event.  
 
6 Conclusion 
Reasons for increased crime during massive sporting events may seem self –evident. As major 
tourist destinations, these debacles attract throngs of confused tourists, frequently inebriated and 
battling a formidable language barrier which may make them appear soft targets for crime. This 
analysis of the effect of the 2012 Summer Olympics in London on crimes against both persons 
and property utilizes fixed and random effect difference-in-difference regressions to improve 
understanding of the relationship between sporting mega-events and crime. Though by no means 
conclusive, interesting results are found. Namely, it appears that crime in the whole of London 
did increase during the event, although the results could not confirm proximity effects by finding 
larger-than-standard crime increases in boroughs which hosted venues for the event. Further, 
these results are not without limitations. The control variables used were equivalent across each 
borough, results likely could be refined by having borough-level macroeconomic variables that 
vary across both i and t. Additionally, although it may be tempting to broadly apply the findings 
of this paper to all sporting events, it should be noted that the relationship observed only exists 
for the data from the 2012 Summer Olympics. Therefore, these results can only be taken as 
suggestive evidence regarding the broader link between sporting mega-events and crime, and are 
unable to confirm or deny the existence of proximity effects. Data restrictions lead to further 
limitations. Although for regression purposes the Olympic dummy variable takes value 1 during 
July and August of 2012, the event only actually occurred between July 27 and August 12, 
meaning more than half the days tagged as “Olympic” actually did not occur during the 
Olympics. Unfortunately, because monthly data is the most precise crime data offered, little can 
be done to rectify this issue. 
This research does have implications, both for policy and for future research. Obviously, 
mega-events are hotly contested between different candidates. Hosting is seen as so prestigious 
that several countries have (allegedly) been driven to corruption, including South Africa in 2010, 
as well as Russia and Qatar for the upcoming 2018 and 2022 World Cups. Despite the desire to 
host, definitive answers regarding the costs and benefits of doing so are difficult to find. This is 
partially due to difficulties in assessing these costs and benefits quantitatively. Although crime is 
less economically significant than, say, the potential employment benefits that come with 
hosting, it is still impactful, especially for the local population in host cities. Therefore, our 
results provide further consideration for host cities and host countries who may be deciding 
whether or not to bid for a mega-event. Additionally, this research provides a framework through 
which similar studies may be contacted. As noted previously, results are somewhat event 
specific, and expansion to other mega-events at other times and in other places could yield 
interesting results. Ultimately, the relationship between mega-events and crime is a relevant cost 
(or benefit) that must be taken into account when weighing the pros and cons of hosting. This 
analysis seeks to contribute to the existing literature by examining a different event. As 
additional research is published, time will tell whether the above findings are more broadly 
applicable. 
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I. Appendix 
 
Summary Statistics for Crime Variables: 
 
 Violence Sex 
Crime 
Robbery Burglary Theft Fraud Person Property 
Mean 385.11 26.36 85.76 230.77 814.79 55.92 497.23 1205.10 
SD 148.04 11.91 59.61 85.32 501.505 55.36 207.38 573.86 
Minimum 16 0 0 0 127 0 16 134 
Maximum 782 80 316 539 3672 366 1071 4215 
Range 766 80 316 539 3545 366 1055 4081 
 
 
Summary Statistics for Crime Variables in Host Boroughs 
 
 
 
Violence Sex 
Crime 
Robbery Burglary Theft Fraud Person Property 
Mean 457.03 30.81 103.06 222.53 831.02 61.98 590.90 1227.91 
SD 82.31 9.60 51.16 38.55 223.42 54.47 123.29 252.93 
Minimum 281 10 22 101 404 0 342 711 
Maximum 663 80 242 317 1380 223 902 1898 
Range 382 70 220 976 976 223 560 1187 
 
 
Summary Statistics for Crime Variables in Non-host Boroughs 
 
 
 
Violence Sex 
Crime 
Robbery Burglary Theft Fraud Person Property 
Mean 369.12 25.37 81.92 232.60 811.19 54.58 476.41 1200.04 
SD 154.54 12.15 60.69 92.47 544.36 55.50 216.38 623.11 
Minimum 16 0 0 0 127 0 16 134 
Maximum 782 72 316 539 3672 366 1071 4215 
Range 766 72 316 539 3545 366 1055 4081 
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